Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter

(1, 2, 3) , (4) , (1, 2, 3)
1
2
3
4

Abstract

We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
selling_mech.pdf (611 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-02288708 , version 1 (15-09-2019)
hal-02288708 , version 2 (03-04-2020)
hal-02288708 , version 3 (20-07-2020)
hal-02288708 , version 4 (21-09-2021)
hal-02288708 , version 5 (27-01-2022)
hal-02288708 , version 6 (04-11-2022)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02288708 , version 6

Cite

David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck. Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter. 2022. ⟨hal-02288708v6⟩
882 View
419 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More