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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

Abstract

In this paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator’s servers to a service provider’s servers.
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Dates and versions

hal-01220107 , version 1 (24-10-2015)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01220107 , version 1

Cite

Mikaël Touati, Rachid Elazouzi, Marceau Coupechoux, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marc Kélif. Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects. ACM SIGMETRICS NetEcon, Jun 2015, Portland, United States. ⟨hal-01220107⟩
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