Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

Mikaël Touati (1, 2, 3) , Rachid Elazouzi (4) , Marceau Coupechoux (2, 3) , Eitan Altman (5, 6) , Jean-Marc Kélif (1)

1 Orange Labs [Issy les Moulineaux]
2 RMS - Réseaux, Mobilité et Services
3 INFRES - Département Informatique et Réseaux
4 LIA - Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon
5 CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée
6 MAESTRO - Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks

In this paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator’s servers to a service provider’s servers.

Domains: Mathematics [math]; Optimization and Control [math.OC]; Computer Science [cs]; Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]

Mikaël Touati, Rachid Elazouzi, Marceau Coupechoux, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marc Kélif. Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects. ACM SIGMETRICS NetEcon, Jun 2015, Portland, United States. ⟨hal-01220107⟩