Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

Abstract : In this paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator's servers to a service provider's servers.
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Submitted on : Saturday, October 24, 2015 - 2:17:31 PM
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Mikaël Touati, Jean-Marc Kélif, Rachid El-Azouzi, Marceau Coupechoux, Eitan Altman. Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Association for Computing Machinery, 2015, 43 (3), pp.72-75. ⟨10.1145/2847220.2847244⟩. ⟨hal-01220107⟩

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