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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

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Abstract

In this paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator’s servers to a service provider’s servers.
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Dates and versions

hal-01220107 , version 1 (24-10-2015)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01220107 , version 1

Cite

Mikaël Touati, Rachid Elazouzi, Marceau Coupechoux, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marc Kélif. Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects. ACM SIGMETRICS NetEcon, Jun 2015, Portland, United States. ⟨hal-01220107⟩
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