Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

Abstract :

In this paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator’s servers to a service provider’s servers.

Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [9 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-imt.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01220107
Contributor : Admin Télécom Paristech <>
Submitted on : Saturday, October 24, 2015 - 2:17:31 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:37:01 PM
Long-term archiving on: Friday, April 28, 2017 - 7:56:25 AM

File

inproceedings-2015-15524-3.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01220107, version 1

Citation

Mikaël Touati, Rachid Elazouzi, Marceau Coupechoux, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marc Kélif. Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects. ACM SIGMETRICS NetEcon, Jun 2015, Portland, United States. ⟨hal-01220107⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

680

Files downloads

245