Distributed Medium Access Control with Dynamic Altruism

Panayotis Antoniadis (1) , Serge Fdida (2, 1) , Christopher Griffin , Youngmi Jin , George Kesidis (3)

1 NPA - Networks and Performance Analysis
2 LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences
3 Department of Computer Science and Engineering [University Park]

In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming “by rule” conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (as in, e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. Our objective is to define a utility model that captures more closely the expected behavior of users, which according to recent results from behavioral and experimental economics should include a conditionally altruistic dimension. The effects of our proposed dynamic altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput based costs, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) users/players.

Domaines: Réseaux et télécommunications [cs.NI]

Panayotis Antoniadis, Serge Fdida, Christopher Griffin, Youngmi Jin, George Kesidis. Distributed Medium Access Control with Dynamic Altruism. ADHOCNETS, Oct 2012, Paris, France. pp.29-42, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-36958-2_3⟩. ⟨hal-00940015⟩